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We examined how perceived causal expertise affects the processing of 
causal persuasive arguments. In Study 1, participants received strong or 
weak causal arguments from a content-area expert who was high or low 
in causal expertise. Participants in the high causal expertise condition 
processed the causal arguments carefully: they were more persuaded by 
strong compared to weak causal arguments. In Study 2, participants re-
ceived a high or low causal confidence prime and then read a message 
from a source who was high or low in content-area expertise. The message 
contained strong or weak, causal or non-causal arguments. Participants 
who received both the causal confidence prime and the high content-area 
expertise information processed the causal arguments carefully: they were 
more persuaded by strong compared to weak causal arguments. These 
findings demonstrate that causal and content-area expertise can increase 
motivation to attend to causal arguments. Implications for the persuasion 
literature are discussed. 
The findings of recent research suggest that when trying to change people’s at-
titudes and beliefs, it is sometimes more important to explain why particular 
outcomes would occur than it is to provide evidence that suggests the outcomes 
would, in fact, occur (Slusher & Anderson, 1996; Tobin & Weary, 2008). Arguments 
that explain the causal mechanism responsible for some effect are called causal 
arguments. For instance, a causal argument against the legalization of casino gam-
bling might claim that casinos attract those who can least afford it and then explain 
why (i.e., “because gambling offers low-income people a chance at riches and a so-
lution to financial hardship,” Tobin & Weary, 2008). A non-causal argument would 
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make the same claim, but then support it with covariation or statistical informa-
tion (i.e., “at most of the country’s casinos, low-income people make up about 78% 
of the crowd at the slot machines”).
Slusher and Anderson (1996) argued that causal arguments should be more ef-
fective than non-causal arguments at changing people’s social theories, or beliefs 
about how and why variables are related. They posited that the persistence of 
social theories depends upon the relative number of available causal explanations 
in support of a given theory compared to those opposing it. Causal arguments 
provide individuals with new explanations that help to shift the balance of expla-
nations in favor of the desired conclusion. Consistent with this idea, Slusher and 
Anderson found that causal arguments were more effective than non-causal argu-
ments in educating people about the transmission of AIDS, due to their effect on 
explanation availability. In addition, they found that causal arguments were not 
as subject to biased evaluation. That is, opposing initial beliefs led participants to 
discount non-causal evidence, but not causal evidence. Causal arguments have 
been applied in other areas as well. For example, in the area of drug marketing, 
Jalnawala and Wilkin (2007) presented participants with causal or non-causal ar-
guments for a new prescription flu prevention medication. The non-causal argu-
ments simply stated the characteristics of the drug (e.g., PrevFlu is convenient, 
safe, and easy to swallow), whereas the causal arguments explained the reasons 
for these properties (e.g., PrevFlu “is convenient because it requires only three oral 
doses per season,” “is safe because it can be used for all ages,” and “has a patented 
gel coating that makes it easy to swallow”). They found that for messages that 
acknowledged the negative features of the drug (as is required by the fair balance 
regulation), causal arguments produced more favorable beliefs about the drug and 
greater intentions to ask their physician about it. 
Interest in causal arguments has arisen in part from an attempt to determine 
what exactly constitutes a strong argument. The importance of causal explanations 
has been established by decades of attribution research (for reviews, see Gilbert, 
1998; Hilton, 2007). These researchers generally agree that people have a funda-
mental need to understand why events happen; it allows them to predict and con-
trol their outcomes in life and affords them a sense of psychological well-being 
(Heider, 1958; Weary & Edwards, 1994, 1996). Accordingly, it seems reasonable to 
posit that addressing causal mechanisms in persuasive communication would be 
effective. 
In his review of social influence tactics, Pratkanis (2007) classified the use of 
causal arguments as storytelling. Much as jury members construct stories to ex-
plain the evidence presented to them during a trial (Hastie & Pennington, 2000; 
Pennington & Hastie, 1992), individuals reading persuasive arguments may con-
struct causal models that capture the presented arguments. Such stories would 
facilitate comprehension of information and allow perceivers to decide on an ap-
propriate course of action (e.g., convict vs. exonerate; accept vs. reject message). 
In addition, prior research shows that causal explanations can lead to belief per-
severance (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980). That is, once someone has explained 
why a relationship exists, they will continue to believe it exists even if the evidence 
that prompted them to generate the explanation is discredited. Thus, it seems that 
causal explanations may be particularly powerful in persuasive appeals. 
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cAUSAl UnceRTAInTy, cAUSAl IMPoRTAnce,  
And cAUSAl ARGUMenTS
Recently, researchers have begun to examine variables that influence the extent 
to which people think carefully about causal arguments (Tobin & Weary, 2008). 
Greater thought is often desired in a persuasion setting because if the process 
underlying attitude change is thoughtful, any resulting change should be longer 
lasting and more resistant to counterpersuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Accord-
ing to dual process models such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic Systematic Model (Chaiken, 1987), individuals 
will think carefully about a message only when they are motivated and able to do 
so. One strategy that can increase a person’s motivation to process a message is 
matching, or tailoring a part of the message to a salient aspect of the person (for 
reviews see Briñol & Petty, 2006; Petty, Wheeler, & Bizer, 2000). Matched messages 
seem more relevant than nonmatched messages, so individuals think about them 
carefully. As a result, persuasion depends upon the quality of the arguments in the 
message: people are more persuaded by strong compared to weak arguments. 
Tobin and Weary (2008) noted that causal arguments could match the current 
concerns of some people better than other people. They examined whether indi-
vidual differences in causal uncertainty and causal importance would affect peo-
ple’s motivation to process causal arguments. Causal uncertainty refers to doubts 
about one’s own understanding of the causes of events in the social world, where-
as causal importance refers to the perceived value of causal understanding (Weary 
& Edwards, 1996; Weary, Tobin, & Edwards, in press). Individuals who are high in 
both causal uncertainty and causal importance are highly motivated to improve 
their understanding of events, particularly when they encounter unexpected as-
sociations (e.g., when reading a counterattitudinal message). These individuals 
should perceive causal arguments as highly relevant to their current concerns and, 
as a result, should attend to them carefully.
Tobin and Weary (2008) found support for this prediction in two studies. When 
participants received a counterattitudinal message, only those who were high in 
both causal uncertainty and causal importance were more persuaded by strong 
compared to weak causal arguments. These findings demonstrate that at least for 
some issues (e.g., the legalization of casino gambling), individuals think carefully 
about causal arguments only when they have chronic concerns about why things 
happen. 
PeRceIved cAUSAl exPeRTISe And cAUSAl ARGUMenTS
It is important to note, however, that matching is not the only way to increase 
elaboration. Increasing a source’s level of perceived expertise also has been found 
to motivate individuals to think carefully about a message when they would not 
have done so otherwise. For instance, Heesacker, Petty, and Cacioppo (1983) found 
that an expert source prompted field-dependent participants, who typically de-
vote few resources to message processing, to think carefully about a persuasive 
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message. As a result, they were more persuaded by strong compared to weak 
arguments. Heesacker et al. argued that source expertise increased participants’ 
motivation to attend to the message by increasing their confidence in the potential 
accuracy of the message. Similarly, Moore, Hausknecht, and Thamodaran (1986) 
found that when it was possible but effortful to process a message (i.e., because it 
was presented at a moderately fast pace), participants’ attitudes were based more 
on argument quality, indicating high levels of message elaboration, when the 
source was high compared to low in expertise. 
It is possible, then, that high levels of perceived source expertise could motivate 
individuals to think carefully about causal persuasive arguments. As Heesacker et 
al. (1983) argued, when conditions do not constrain elaboration to be high or low, 
perceivers may expend their resources strategically, attending to those messages 
that are likely to be valid. However, when dealing with causal arguments, two 
facets of source expertise are relevant: content-area expertise, or a source’s general 
knowledge about some field (e.g., gambling), and causal expertise, or a source’s 
understanding of causal mechanisms. Past studies not concerned specifically with 
causal arguments typically have focused on content-area expertise. For instance, 
in Heesacker et al.’s (1983, pp. 657-658) study, a report in favor of senior compre-
hensive exams was prepared by “Dr. John Samuels, a professor of education at 
Princeton University” (high expertise) or John Samuels, a student in a journalism 
class at a local high school (low expertise). Similarly, in Moore et al.’s (1986, p. 94) 
study, a new calculator was described by “a professor of mathematics at Princeton 
University” or “a high school student from New Jersey.”
A closer examination of prior research on causal arguments, however, reveals 
that attributing causal arguments to a source high in content-area expertise does 
not motivate elaborative processing in the average perceiver. Specifically, Tobin 
and Weary (2008) told all of their participants that the source of their antigambling 
message was a leading social scientist (Michael Thompson, Ph.D., from the Insti-
tute for the Study of Social Issues), but only participants who were chronically 
preoccupied with improving their causal understanding thought carefully about 
his causal arguments. In order to motivate the average perceiver, it might be neces-
sary to also increase the source’s level of perceived causal expertise. When a source 
is high in both content-area and causal expertise, he or she is capable of producing 
valid causal explanations. Perceivers who are not otherwise motivated to attend to 
causal arguments may do so under these conditions in order to learn the underly-
ing causes of the arguments and improve their causal knowledge. 
The cURRenT ReSeARch
We tested this hypothesis in two studies. In Study 1, we explicitly told participants 
that the author of a message (who was always high in content-area expertise) ei-
ther did or did not have a good grasp on cause-effect relationships. In Study 2, we 
primed participants to feel confident or doubtful about other people’s grasp of 
cause-effect relationships in a seemingly unrelated task. We then presented par-
ticipants with causal or non-causal arguments which were attributed to a source 
who was high or low in content-area expertise. In both studies, we manipulated 
argument quality in order to examine participants’ levels of message elaboration. 
We expected to observe the largest argument quality effect, indicating high levels 
PerCeived CAUsAl exPertise And PersUAsion 109
of elaboration, when a source perceived as high in both content-area and causal 
expertise offered causal arguments. 
stUdy 1
In Study 1, we presented all participants with a counterattitudinal message that ar-
gued against extending the length of Spring Break.1 The source of the message was 
always high in content-area expertise and the message always contained causal 
arguments. However, we manipulated the quality of the causal arguments (strong 
or weak) and the causal expertise of the source (high or low). We predicted that 
participants would think more about the causal arguments when the source was 
high compared to low in causal expertise. As a result, they should be more sensi-
tive to the argument quality manipulation and adopt the position of the message 
more when the arguments were strong compared to weak. 
PARTIcIPAnTS
One hundred eleven undergraduate psychology students participated in the study 
for extra credit. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in this 2 (causal 
expertise: high, low) X 2 (argument quality: strong, weak) between-subjects facto-
rial design. The data from 14 participants were excluded: seven participants did 
not spend adequate time on the computer screen containing the causal expertise in-
formation (less than 6 seconds), four participants indicated some awareness of the 
purpose of the causal expertise manipulation, two participants skipped through 
one or more of the questions in fewer than 300 milliseconds (Bargh & Chartrand, 
2000), and one person knew an individual who shared the source’s name. 
After these exclusions, the sample consisted of 13 male (13%) and 84 female 
(87%) participants. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 58 years old (M = 22.75). 
The ethnic composition of the sample was 26% Asian American, 23% Caucasian, 
23% African American, 18% Hispanic, 9% Other, and 2% International.
PRocedURe
Participants were run in groups of one to seven; however, each participant was 
assigned to an individual computer station. All study materials were presented 
via MediaLab (Jarvis, 2004). Participants were told that they were taking part in 
a study that examines people’s perceptions of issues in the social world. They 
learned that they would be asked to read a short essay that had appeared recently 
1. Sixty-two participants had rated their attitudes toward a Spring Break extension in a pilot study. 
The median score was 5 on a 6-point scale, where 1 indicated strong disagreement and 6 indicated 
strong agreement with the extension (M = 4.00, SD = 2.09). Overall then, participants were in favor 
of the extension. In addition, attitude certainty was rather high. The median certainty score was 6 
on scale of 1 (not at all certain) to 6 (extremely certain; M = 5.19, SD = 1.27). Based on these data, it 
seemed reasonable to assume that most participants in the main study would have found the anti-
extension position of the message to be counterattitudinal.
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in a local newspaper, in response to an open call for opinions about recent changes 
happening at some universities in the U.S. They were told that they would be 
asked to answer some questions about the essay when they had finished reading 
it. 
Content-Area Expertise Information. All participants were informed that the essay 
had been submitted by Dr. Jason Phillips, a leading social scientist who special-
izes in the health and well-being of university students. They further read that Dr. 
Phillips had been conducting research on predictors of physical and psychological 
well-being for over 25 years and had published over 40 articles and 5 books on the 
topic. This information indicates a high level of content-area expertise. 
Causal Expertise Manipulation. In the high causal expertise condition, the para-
graph went on to say that Dr. Phillips “is well respected for his understanding 
of people’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior. Not only can he predict the effects 
that various policies will have on students, he is also very good at pinpointing 
the underlying causes.” In contrast, in the low causal expertise condition, the final 
sentences of the paragraph read “However, oftentimes people doubt his under-
standing of people’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior. He can predict the effects 
that various policies will have on students, but he is not very good at pinpointing 
the underlying causes.”
Argument Quality Manipulation. Participants then read a counterattitudinal per-
suasive message that argued against extending the length of Spring Break from 
one to two weeks. The author began by claiming that there had been recent talk at 
some universities about extending the length of Spring Break. He mentioned that 
some universities in the U.S. and a number of universities overseas already have 
a longer break. However, he went on to argue that a careful examination of the is-
sue revealed that the two-week Spring Break might not be as good as it seems. The 
author offered three causal arguments in support of his position. Depending upon 
argument quality condition, the arguments were either strong or weak. Similar 
to the approach taken by Tobin and Weary (2008, Study 1), the strong arguments 
described very undesirable consequences while the weak arguments described 
somewhat undesirable consequences. Specifically, in the strong argument condi-
tion, the author argued that students would experience negative emotions during 
the extended break, and increased stress levels and lower grades upon their return 
to school. In the weak argument condition, he argued that students would not 
be able to check their e-mail as much as they would like to, and that they would 
experience higher instances of sleeping in and reduced reading efficiency upon 
return to school. 
All arguments contained causal explanations. For example, stress was said to 
increase with the extended break “because the longer students are away from their 
classes, the more effort it takes to start up again.” Similarly, rates of sleeping in 
were said to increase “because the longer students go without waking up early, 
the more their sleep cycles reset themselves.” In all conditions, the author ended 
by recommending that Spring Break should not be extended, claiming no real ben-
efits and some potential costs for students.
Dependent Measures. Next, participants were told that because their personal 
views about extending the length of Spring Break from one to two weeks might 
influence their impressions of the essay, a measure of their own opinion on the is-
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sue was desired. On a 7-point semantic differential scale, participants rated the fa-
vorability of a two-week Spring Break (unfavorable; favorable). Participants then 
rated on 7-point scales the author’s level of knowledge, causal understanding, and 
likability. They also were asked to rate the desirability (-3 = very undesirable; +3 = 
very desirable) of each of the three consequences in the essay (i.e., increased nega-
tive emotions, stress levels, and lower grades in the strong argument condition; 
decreased e-mail usage, reading efficiency, and more oversleeping in the weak 
argument condition). 
To probe for suspicion about our hypotheses, we asked participants what they 
thought the study had been about. After responding to this item, participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.
resUlts
PeRcePTIonS oF The SoURce
To check on the effectiveness of our causal expertise manipulation, we conducted 
2 (causal expertise) X 2 (argument quality) ANOVAs on perceptions of the source’s 
knowledge, causal understanding, and likability. We expected our causal expertise 
manipulation to primarily affect perceptions of the source’s causal understand-
ing, rather than his general knowledge or likability. As predicted, these analyses 
revealed only a main effect of causal expertise on perceived causal understanding, 
F(1, 93) = 16.62, p < .001. Participants thought the source understood the underly-
ing causes of events better in the high (M = 5.50) compared to low (M = 4.29) causal 
expertise condition. There were no significant effects on perceived likability, ps > 
.17.
Although there were no significant effects on perceived general knowledge, 
the causal expertise main effect approached significance, F(1, 93) = 3.45, p < .07. 
Participants thought the author was more knowledgeable in the high (M = 5.21) 
compared to low (M = 4.69) causal expertise condition. Because this finding sug-
gests some degree of overlap between general knowledge and causal expertise, 
we conducted an ANCOVA to examine whether the effect of our causal expertise 
manipulation on perceived causal understanding remained significant when we 
controlled for perceived knowledge. This analysis revealed that the effect of causal 
expertise condition on perceived causal understanding remained significant, F(1, 
92) = 13.51, p < .001, when we controlled for perceived knowledge. 
We then conducted an additional ANCOVA to examine whether the effect of 
causal expertise condition on perceived knowledge remained marginally signif-
icant when we controlled for perceived causal understanding. This analysis re-
vealed that the effect of causal expertise condition on perceived knowledge was 
not significant, F(1, 92) = 0.84, p = .36, when we controlled for perceived causal 
understanding. These analyses support the idea that although there was some 
spillover to perceived general knowledge, our causal expertise manipulation had 
a stronger influence on perceived causal understanding.
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PeRcePTIonS oF The ARGUMenTS
Next, we examined perceptions of the arguments. We created a consequence desir-
ability index (α = .70) by averaging together the three desirability ratings. Then, 
we conducted a 2 (causal expertise) X 2 (argument quality) ANOVA on perceived 
consequence desirability. As predicted, we observed only a main effect of argu-
ment quality, F(1, 93) = 42.40, p < .001. Participants viewed the consequences of 
the Spring Break extension as less desirable in the strong (M = -2.00) compared to 
weak (M = -0.34) argument condition.
ATTITUdeS
Before examining attitudes, we reverse-scored responses so that higher numbers 
indicated greater negativity toward a two-week Spring Break, or greater persua-
sion. Next, we tested our central hypothesis with a 2 (causal expertise) X 2 (argu-
ment quality) ANOVA. This analysis revealed only the predicted two-way interac-
tion, F(1, 93) = 4.39, p < .05. (See Figure 1.) Recall that we had anticipated a larger 
argument quality effect in the high causal expertise condition. Because we had 
specific directional predictions (i.e., more persuasion by strong compared to weak 
arguments), we employed one-tailed tests of significance for our planned com-
parisons and simple slope tests. Planned comparisons revealed that the argument 
quality effect was significant in the high causal expertise condition, t(93) = 1.79, p < 
.05. Participants were more persuaded by the strong (M = 4.00) compared to weak 
(M = 3.04) causal arguments. However, there was no significant effect of argument 
quality in the low causal expertise condition, t(93) = -1.17, p = .13. 
Next, we conducted two regression analyses to test the idea that perceived caus-
al understanding, rather than general knowledgeability, increased elaboration. 
Specifically, we examined whether perceived causal understanding or perceived 
knowledge interacted with argument quality to predict attitudes. We first standard-
ized attitudes, perceived causal understanding, and perceived knowledge. Argu-
ment quality was effects-coded (+1 = strong argument, -1 = weak argument). 
In the first regression analysis, attitudes were regressed on argument quality, 
perceived causal understanding, and the interaction. The Argument Quality X 
Perceived Causal Understanding interaction was significant, β = .21, t(93) = 2.04, 
p < .05. Simple slopes tests revealed a significant effect of argument quality for 
participants one standard deviation (SD) above the mean on perceived causal un-
derstanding, β = .25, t(93) = 1.74, p < .05. Participants who rated the source as 
having a relatively high level of causal understanding were more persuaded by 
strong compared to weak arguments. The comparable slope was nonsignificant 
for participants one SD below the mean on perceived causal understanding, β = 
-.16, t(93) = -1.15, p = .13. 
In the second regression analysis, attitudes were regressed on argument quality, 
perceived knowledge, and the interaction. There were no significant effects, ps > 
.53. Thus, higher levels of perceived general knowledge were not associated with 
increased elaboration.
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disCUssion
Analyses revealed that participants recognized that the consequences of the Spring 
Break extension were less desirable in the strong compared to weak argument con-
dition. However, as predicted, an examination of participants’ attitudes toward 
the extension revealed a significant argument quality effect only in the high causal 
expertise condition. These participants were more persuaded by strong compared 
to weak arguments. This effect is consistent with the idea that participants attend-
ed to the causal arguments only when they expected them to be valid. 
Our examination of source perceptions supported the distinction between gen-
eral and causal expertise. We found that the causal expertise manipulation had 
the strongest influence on perceptions of the source’s causal understanding, com-
pared to his general knowledge or likability. Importantly, even though the causal 
expertise manipulation had somewhat of an effect on perceived knowledge, only 
perceived causal understanding had the predicted effect on attitudes. 
Last, we should note that although the absolute level of persuasion in the high 
causal expertise/strong causal argument condition was not substantially greater 
than that observed in the low causal expertise conditions, the presence of the ar-
gument quality effect indicates that participants engaged in relatively high levels 
of elaboration. This implies that any observed attitude change will likely persist 
longer over time and be more resistant to future challenges (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986). Persuasion in the low causal expertise condition, on the other hand, is likely 
to be short lived. Overall, the findings of Study 1 support the idea that the source’s 
level of perceived causal expertise affects the average participant’s motivation to 
process causal arguments. 
FIGURe 1. effects of causal expertise and argument quality on attitudes in Study 1.
Note. higher numbers indicate greater negativity toward the extension, or greater persuasion.
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stUdy 2
In Study 2, we sought to replicate the findings of Study 1 using a different manipu-
lation of perceived causal expertise. We were particularly interested in whether 
perceivers’ internal states could contribute to their perceptions of causal expertise. 
Just as individuals differ in their chronic and temporary doubts about their own 
explanations (Weary & Edwards, 1994, 1996), they also likely differ in their chronic 
and temporary perceptions of other people’s explanations. To see if such internal 
states affected interest in causal arguments, we primed causal confidence in Study 
2. 
Past studies have used various types of priming manipulations to temporarily 
alter participants’ perceptions of their own causal understanding of events (Weary, 
Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001; Wichman, Brunner, & Weary, 2008). These re-
searchers argued that even individuals without chronic causal uncertainty know 
what it is like not to understand something and that priming them with statements 
expressing causal uncertainty increases the accessibility of these beliefs. Similarly, 
it seems reasonable to assume that most people have experienced, at times, confi-
dence or doubt in another person’s understanding of the causes of events. There-
fore, it should be possible to temporarily alter their perceptions of other people’s 
causal understanding of events with a priming manipulation. 
We thought that primed confidence in other people’s causal explanations would 
have a similar effect on the processing of causal arguments as did the explicit causal 
expertise information in Study 1. A generalized sense that others understand why 
events occur should give one some degree of confidence that a particular other 
(e.g., the source of the message) will understand. However, when the source lacks 
content-area expertise confidence should drop, because both causal and content-
area expertise are necessary for the production of valid causal arguments. Thus, 
we expected participants to think carefully about a source’s causal arguments only 
when they feel that the source understands why events occur and possesses exper-
tise in the content area.
To test this hypothesis, we primed participants with a high or low level of causal 
confidence and then presented them with a persuasive message that argued against 
a longer Spring Break. As in Study 1, we manipulated the quality of the arguments 
in the message (strong or weak) so that we would have an indicator of message 
elaboration. We also manipulated the source’s level of content-area expertise (high 
or low) and the type of arguments (causal or non-causal) so that we could test the 
hypothesis that causal confidence affects message elaboration only when content-
area expertise is high and causal explanations are present. We predicted that the 
highest levels of message elaboration would occur in the high causal confidence/
high content-area expertise/causal argument condition. These participants should 
be more persuaded by the strong compared to weak arguments. We also assessed 
cognitive responses so that we could examine whether this effect was due to more 
favorable thoughts about the message. When participants are thinking carefully, 
they should generate more favorable thoughts about the issue after reading the 
strong compared to weak arguments, and these thoughts should predict their at-
titudes (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
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method
PARTIcIPAnTS
One hundred eighty undergraduate psychology and marketing students partici-
pated in the study for extra credit. Participants were randomly assigned to condi-
tions in this 2 (causal confidence prime: high, low) X 2 (content-area expertise: high, 
low) X 2 (argument type: causal, non-causal) X 2 (argument quality: strong, weak) 
between-subjects factorial design. The data from 5 participants were excluded: 3 
participants skipped through one or more of the questions in fewer than 300 mil-
liseconds (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) and 2 participants indicated some awareness 
of the purpose of the scrambled sentence task during the funnel debriefing. 
After these exclusions, the sample consisted of 45 male (26%) and 130 female 
(74%) participants. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 47 years old (M = 24.23). 
The ethnic composition of the sample was 31% Caucasian, 25% Asian American, 
22% Hispanic, 13% African American, 7% Other, and 2% International.
PRocedURe 
Participants were run in groups of one to seven, but each participant was assigned 
to an individual cubicle containing a computer and a paper-and-pencil question-
naire packet. The questionnaire packet contained a scrambled-sentence priming 
task and a consumer survey. Participants were told that since the main study 
would not take the full time, researchers first were presenting two short studies 
for other researchers. Participants were asked to complete the paper-and-pencil 
packet before starting the computer-based study. 
Priming Task. Following the procedure recommended by Bargh and Chartrand 
(2000), we told participants that the scrambled-sentence task was part of a linguis-
tics project for use with high school students. We instructed participants to write 
down a grammatically correct four-word sentence for each of the five-word sets 
that followed. In other words, participants would have to rearrange the words to 
make a meaningful sentence, leaving out one of the words in the set. The instruc-
tions told them to work quickly, without spending too long on any given item. An 
example sentence followed, along with 20 word sets: 10 active sentences that were 
relevant to other people’s causal understanding of events and 10 filler sentences. 
See Appendix A. 
Depending upon condition, the active sentences portrayed others as either un-
derstanding or not understanding the causes of events. The word sets were based 
in part on sentences used by Wichman et al. (2008). However, we modified the 
target pronouns from personal pronouns (me, I, and my) to other-relevant pro-
nouns (he, she, they, him, her, and them). In half of the active word sets, one of 
the causally-relevant words was included in the four-word sentence. In the other 
half, the causally-relevant word was the excluded word. However, because causal 
understanding is a complex construct, sometimes both the included and excluded 
words were used to convey high or low levels of causal understanding. After un-
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scrambling all twenty word sets, participants rated how difficult the sentences 
were, and how difficult they would be for a high school student.
Participants then completed a filler task. Specifically, they were asked to indicate 
how often they consumed various beverages and went to various restaurants. This 
survey was included because previous research using a similar priming task found 
that the primed construct had more of an influence on the dependent measure 
after a brief delay (Wichman et al., 2008). After the consumer items, participants 
were asked to place the questionnaire packet on top of the computer and turn on 
the monitor in order to begin the main study.
Persuasive Message. Next, in an ostensibly unrelated study, we told participants 
that they were going to read a short essay that had appeared recently in a local 
newspaper about changes happening at some universities in the U.S. Depending 
upon content-area expertise condition, participants were told that the essay had 
been submitted by either a leading social scientist who specializes in the health 
and well-being of university students (high content-area expertise), or a dental 
technician who is interested in sending his children to university when they get 
older (low content-area expertise). Furthermore, at the top of the computer screen 
displaying the essay, the author was listed as either Jason Phillips, Ph.D., Social 
Scientist (high content-area expertise) or Jason Phillips, Dental Technician (low 
content-area expertise), depending on condition. 
We used the same strong and weak causal arguments that we had used in Study 
1. For the non-causal arguments, instead of explaining why the negative conse-
quences would occur, we provided statistical information that suggested that the 
effects would occur (Slusher & Anderson, 1996; Tobin & Weary, 2008). For exam-
ple, to support the idea that stress levels would increase, we stated that “studies 
have found that vacations longer than 5 to 7 days increased post-vacation stress 
among students by up to 16%.” Similarly, to support the idea that rates of sleeping 
in would increase, we stated that “studies have found that vacations longer than 5 
to 7 days almost doubled the number of post-vacation snooze presses.” 
Dependent Measures. Five items tapped participants’ attitudes toward the ex-
tended break. Participants rated the extended break on four 7-point semantic dif-
ferential scales: unfavorable/favorable, bad/good, foolish/wise, and harmful/
beneficial. They also rated the extent to which they agreed with the proposal that 
Spring Break should be extended from one week to two weeks on a scale of 1 (do 
not agree at all) to 7 (agree completely). 
Next, participants were asked to list the thoughts they had while reading the 
essay. They were told simply to write down the thoughts that came to their minds, 
ignoring spelling, grammar, and punctuation (a phrase could be sufficient). They 
were urged to be completely honest and list all thoughts they had. Further, they 
were asked to list as many thoughts as they could, but to enter only one per box. 
They were able to enter up to eight thoughts. 
As in Study 1, participants rated the desirability of the three consequences men-
tioned in the essay. In addition, to examine whether our causal confidence prime 
affected participants’ own feelings, we included a 4-item measure of current un-
certainty feelings. The items were based in part on those used by Vaughn and Wea-
ry (2003). We asked participants to indicate on 5-point scales (not at all; extremely) 
the extent to which they currently felt uncertain, confused, confident (reversed), 
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and doubtful. We also asked participants to indicate how happy they were in order 
to get at general positive affect.
Lastly, following Bargh and Chartrand’s (2000) recommendations, we conduct-
ed a funnel debriefing at the end of the experiment to probe for suspicion. Specifi-
cally, we first asked participants to describe what they thought the purposes of 
the studies had been. Next, we asked whether they thought that the studies were 
related in any way (yes or no). If they indicated that they were related, we asked 
them to describe how they were related. Then, we asked participants whether any-
thing they did in the short studies packet could have influenced what they did 
on the rest of the tasks (yes or no). If they indicated that it could have, we asked 
them to describe the nature of the influence. Last, we asked participants whether 
they had noticed a theme to the sentences that they constructed in the short stud-
ies packet (yes or no). If they indicated that there was a theme, we asked them to 
describe it. Only 2 of the 180 participants expressed any awareness of the purpose 
of the scrambled sentence task, and as indicated earlier, their data were excluded 
from the analyses. 
resUlts
PeRcePTIonS oF The SoURce
We pilot tested the causal confidence prime and content-area expertise informa-
tion in a separate study (n = 64). Depending upon condition, participants received 
the high or low causal confidence prime and then the high or low content-area 
expertise information. Without having read the persuasive message, participants 
rated on 7-point scales how qualified the author was to write about extending the 
length of Spring Break, how valid they thought the author’s arguments would be, 
and how well the author would understand the underlying causes of any negative 
consequences associated with a longer break. The first two items assessed content-
area expertise while the last one assessed causal expertise. 
Analyses revealed content-area expertise main effects on perceived qualifica-
tions, F(1, 60) = 28.43, p < .001, validity, F(1, 60) = 10.12, p < .01, and causal under-
standing, F(1, 60) = 21.15, p < .001. Compared to the dental technician, the social 
scientist was seen as more qualified (M = 4.81 vs. 2.88), likely to provide more val-
id arguments (M = 4.63 vs. 3.56), and likely to better understand the causes of any 
break-related outcomes (M = 5.00 vs. 3.47). We also observed a significant Causal 
Confidence Prime X Content-Area Expertise interaction on perceived causal ex-
pertise, F(1, 60) = 3.88, p = .05. The comparable interaction was not significant for 
how qualified or how valid, ps > .26.
As in Study 1, it seemed there was some potential overlap between content-
area and causal expertise. To ensure that our observed effects on perceived causal 
understanding were not due to perceived content-area expertise, we conducted 
an ANCOVA with perceived validity as a covariate (perceived qualification was 
not a significant covariate). The Causal Confidence Prime X Content-Area Exper-
tise interaction remained significant, F(1, 59) = 7.88, p < .01, when we controlled 
for perceived validity. Planned comparisons on the adjusted means revealed that 
perceptions of the social scientist’s causal understanding were higher when par-
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ticipants had received the high (M = 5.08) compared to low (M = 4.41) confidence 
prime, t(59) = 1.60, p < .06. Conversely, perceptions of the dental technician’s caus-
al understanding were lower when participants had received the high (M = 3.22) 
compared to low (M = 4.22) confidence prime, t(59) = -2.41, p < .01. 
The confidence prime boosted perceptions of the source’s causal understanding 
when he was described as a content-area expert. This finding is consistent with the 
idea that valid causal arguments require both causal and content-area expertise. 
However, unexpectedly the causal confidence prime reduced confidence in the 
source’s causal understanding of events when he was low in content-area exper-
tise. This effect may have been due to comparison processes (e.g., compared to 
others who understand the causes of events, this person seems ill suited to explain 
the causes of events in this domain).
PeRcePTIonS oF The ARGUMenTS
As in Study 1, we created a consequence desirability index (α = .72) by averaging 
together the three desirability ratings. Then, we conducted a 2 (primed causal con-
fidence) X 2 (content-area expertise) X 2 (argument type) X 2 (argument quality) 
ANOVA on perceived consequence desirability. As in Study 1, we observed only 
a main effect of argument quality, F(1, 159) = 30.51, p < .001. Participants viewed 
the consequences of the Spring Break extension as less desirable in the strong (M = 
-1.63) compared to weak (M= -0.49) argument condition.
ATTITUdeS 
Participants’ responses to the five attitude items first were reverse-scored such that 
higher numbers indicated greater persuasion. These items were averaged to create 
an attitude index (α = .95). Next, we tested our main predictions with a 2 (primed 
causal confidence) X 2 (content-area expertise) X 2 (argument type) X 2 (argument 
quality) ANOVA on the attitude index. We observed a main effect of argument 
quality, F(1, 159) = 7.21, p < .01. Strong arguments (M = 4.68) were more persuasive 
than weak arguments (M = 4.00). However, we also obtained the predicted 4-way 
interaction, F(1, 159) = 4.09, p < .05. (See Figure 2.)
Recall that we had expected this interaction to be driven by enhanced scrutiny 
of the causal arguments (i.e., a large argument quality effect) among participants 
who should have felt particularly confident in the source’s causal understanding 
of events (i.e., high causal confidence and high content-area expertise). To examine 
the interaction in a systematic fashion, we broke down the sample by confidence 
conditions. We first conducted 2 (source expertise) X 2 (argument type) X 2 (argu-
ment quality) ANOVAs within prime condition. Consistent with our predictions, 
we found that the 3-way interaction was significant only when participants had 
been primed to feel confident in other people’s causal understanding, F(1, 81) = 
4.03, p < .05. There were no significant effects in the low causal confidence condi-
tion, ps > .13. 
From there, we found that the 3-way interaction in the high causal confidence 
condition was driven by the presence of a significant Argument Type X Argument 
Quality interaction in the high content-area expertise condition, F(1, 40) = 4.40, p 
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< .05. There were no significant effects in the low content-area expertise condition, 
ps > .34. 
Last, we examined the Argument Type X Argument Quality interaction in the 
high causal confidence/high content-area expertise condition with planned com-
parisons. As expected, we found evidence of argument scrutiny only in the causal 
argument condition, t(40) = 3.12, p < .01. That is, in the causal argument condition, 
participants were significantly more persuaded by strong (M = 5.89) compared 
to weak (M = 3.71) arguments. However, in the non-causal argument condition, 
strong (M = 4.22) and weak (M = 4.11) arguments were equally persuasive, t(40) = 
0.16, p = .44. 
ThoUGhT FAvoRABIlITy
We then turned to participants’ cognitive responses. We would expect participants 
who appeared to be thinking carefully (i.e., those in the causal confidence prime/
high content-area expertise/causal argument condition) to generate more favor-
able issue-relevant thoughts when they had received strong compared to weak 
arguments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). We also would expect them to base their at-
titudes upon their issue-relevant thoughts, such that more favorable thoughts pre-
dict greater persuasion. Moreover, we predicted that thought favorability would 
mediate the effect of argument quality on attitudes for this group of participants: 
the argument quality effect should become nonsignificant when we control for 
thought favorability.
FIGURe 2. effects of primed causal confidence, content-area expertise, argument type, and 
argument quality on attitudes in Study 2.
Note. higher numbers indicate greater negativity toward the extension, or greater persuasion. 
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To examine this possibility, we first had a research assistant who was blind to 
condition code participants’ issue-relevant thoughts as favorable, unfavorable, or 
neutral with respect to the author’s position (Cacioppo, Harkins, & Petty, 1981; Ca-
cioppo & Petty, 1981; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). We then created an index of thought 
favorability by subtracting the number of unfavorable from favorable thoughts 
and dividing by the total number of favorable and unfavorable thoughts. A second 
research assistant coded a subset of the thoughts (n = 30) so that we could examine 
inter-rater reliability. As expected, thought indices based on the two sets of ratings 
were highly correlated, r = .80, p < .001. 
Next, following standard recommendations for testing mediational models 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005), we conducted a series of 
regressions in order to examine whether greater persuasion by strong compared to 
weak arguments among participants in the causal confidence prime/high content-
area expertise/causal argument condition was due to more favorable cognitive 
responses. First, we established that argument quality (+1 = strong, -1 = weak) pre-
dicted attitudes, β = .54, t(20) = 2.84, p < .05. Stronger arguments led to greater per-
suasion. Second, we found that argument quality predicted thought favorability, β 
= .51, t(20) = 2.63, p < .05. Stronger arguments led to more favorable thought pro-
files. Third, we showed that controlling for argument quality, thought favorability 
predicted attitudes, β = .57, t(19) = 3.16, p < .01. More favorable thought profiles 
were associated with greater persuasion. Fourth, we found that after controlling 
for thought favorability, argument quality did not significantly predict attitudes, 
β = .25, t(19) = 1.35, p = .19. A Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) revealed that the drop in 
magnitude of the argument quality effect on attitudes when thought favorabil-
ity was controlled was significant, Z = 2.02, p < .05. Thus, our findings revealed 
that thought favorability mediated the observed effect of argument quality on at-
titudes. We should note that thought favorability did not interact with argument 
quality to predict attitudes, p = .68.
UnceRTAInTy FeelInGS And AFFecT
After reverse scoring the appropriate item, we averaged together the four uncer-
tainty items (α = .68). A 2 (primed causal confidence) X 2 (content-area expertise) 
X 2 (argument type) X 2 (argument quality) ANOVA revealed no significant main 
or interactive effects of the prime, ps > .15, or of any of the other variables, ps > 
.07. Next, we examined the happiness item. A 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA revealed no 
significant effects associated with prime condition, ps > .12, or any of the other 
variables, ps > .05. Thus, our prime did not affect participants’ personal levels of 
uncertainty or happiness.
In addition, we examined whether our predicted 4-way interaction on attitudes 
remained significant when we controlled for uncertainty feelings. We first checked 
to see if there were any significant interactions between uncertainty feelings and 
our other predictors. There was a significant Argument Quality X Uncertainty 
Feelings interaction, β = .18, t(143) = 2.14, p < .05. Simple slope tests revealed a 
significant argument quality effect at 1 SD above the mean on uncertainty feelings, 
β = .40, t(143) = 3.36, p < .001, but not at 1 SD below the mean on uncertainty feel-
ings, β = .03, t(143) = 0.26, p = .40. This finding is consistent with previous research 
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which has found that self-directed uncertainty can increase elaboration (Tiedens & 
Linton, 2001). Importantly, when we entered uncertainty feelings and their inter-
action with argument quality as covariates in an ANCOVA, our predicted 4-way 
interaction remained significant, F(1, 157) = 4.61, p < .05. 
Happiness had no significant main or interactive effects on attitudes. When we 
included happiness as a covariate in an ANCOVA, our predicted 4-way interaction 
remained significant, F(1, 158) = 3.86, p = .05. 
disCUssion
In Study 2, primed causal confidence and content-area expertise together led to a 
greater scrutiny of the source’s causal arguments, as evidenced by the relatively 
large argument quality effect. In addition, an examination of participants’ cog-
nitive responses to the causal arguments in the causal confidence prime/high 
content-area expertise condition revealed that thought favorability mediated the 
effect of argument quality on attitudes. This finding further supports the idea that 
participants in the causal confidence prime/high content-area expertise condition 
were thinking carefully about the causal arguments.
The inclusion of a non-causal condition in Study 2 helped to demonstrate that 
the combined effect of causal confidence and content-area expertise on persuasion 
was specific to causal arguments. This effect supports the idea that our prime af-
fected confidence in the causal realm, rather than confidence in general. 
Readers may wonder whether our prime might have affected perceptions of one-
self rather than others or affect rather than uncertainty. We think these possibilities 
are unlikely for several reasons. First, in Study 2, we found that our prime did not 
affect participants’ own levels of confidence or happiness. Rather, the prime likely 
established an expectancy that a subsequently encountered individual (e.g., the 
source of the persuasive message) would or would not understand why events 
happen. Low expectancies would have resulted in low motivation to process the 
message, but not to uncertainty. Perceivers simply would have expected the source 
not to understand and paid little attention to his explanations. High expectancies 
would have resulted in higher motivation to process the message, unless other 
cues undermine these expectancies (e.g., low content expertise). 
Second, had the words in the uncertainty prime condition increased personal 
levels of uncertainty or negative affect, we would have expected increased levels 
of elaboration in this condition (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Tiedens & 
Linton, 2001). However, in the uncertain prime condition, we observed no signifi-
cant effects of argument quality on attitudes. Interestingly, we did see this relation-
ship with naturally occurring levels of uncertainty. Participants who expressed 
more uncertainty in themselves exhibited a larger argument quality effect than 
those who expressed less uncertainty. 
Third, in a collateral research program (Tobin & Raymundo, 2006), we found that 
replacing the other-relevant pronouns with personal pronouns produced different 
effects. Specifically, when the sentences primed uncertainty in one’s own causal 
understanding, participants were persuaded by causal over non-causal argu-
ments, regardless of their quality. When the sentences primed confidence in one’s 
own causal understanding, however, there were no significant effects of argument 
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type or quality on attitudes. These findings are different from those observed in 
the current study, where uncertainty in other people’s causal understanding led to 
no effects of argument type or quality, and confidence led to careful thought about 
causal arguments. Thus, altering the pronouns in the priming task did seem to 
alter the target of uncertainty.
generAl disCUssion
In two studies, we found that people thought carefully about causal arguments 
when they were attributed to a content-area expert who was thought to under-
stand the causes of events. Increased elaboration was indicated by greater persua-
sion by strong compared to weak causal arguments. This type of central route or 
systematic processing is desirable whenever attitudes need to persist over time 
and resist future attacks (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Furthermore, the 
causal arguments would have provided participants with causal accounts, which 
could continue to imply the existence of the stated associations even in the face of 
disconfirming evidence (Anderson et al., 1980). Thus, when causal arguments are 
carefully processed, resulting attitudes and beliefs might be particularly resistant 
to subsequent challenges.
We should note that our findings are consistent with past research which has 
found that source expertise can increase message elaboration (Heesacker et al., 
1983; Moore et al., 1986). It seems that when the motivation to process a message 
is neither particularly high nor low, perceivers expend their cognitive resources 
strategically. They think carefully about a message only when it seems likely that 
the source possesses the necessary level of expertise to deliver valid arguments. 
Our findings indicate that when deciding if they should process causal arguments, 
perceivers consider the source’s expertise in the specific content area, as well as his 
probable level of causal understanding. Furthermore, explicit information about 
the source’s causal expertise (Study 1) and implicit perceptions of other people’s 
causal understanding (Study 2) produced similar effects.
AlTeRnATIve oUTcoMeS And PRoceSSeS
Readers may wonder why participants did not rely on source expertise as a heu-
ristic. When causal arguments were presented and the source possessed both con-
tent-area and causal expertise, we think that participants wanted to learn the rea-
sons for the stated associations. Such an understanding would help them to better 
predict and control their outcomes in life. This is not to say that causal expertise 
could never serve as a cue. Causal expertise may affect attitudes through the pe-
ripheral route when people are unable to engage in elaborative processing due to 
competing cognitive demands or overly complex causal explanations. This would 
result in little distinction between strong and weak causal arguments, but greater 
persuasion when the source was high compared to low in causal and content-area 
expertise. 
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In the non-causal condition, it would not have been surprising if content-area 
expertise had served as a heuristic cue. However, it is also possible that a lack of 
motivation simply resulted in inertia (i.e., persistence of initial attitudes; Chaiken, 
Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996). 
Last, although we have argued that accuracy motivation prompted the increased 
processing we observed when causal arguments were presented by a source high 
in content-area and causal expertise, some may wonder whether defensive pro-
cessing may provide a better account. Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken (1997) defined 
defense motivation as “the desire to hold attitudes and beliefs that are congruent 
with one’s perceived material interests or one’s current self-defining attitudes and 
beliefs” (p. 85). They found that participants were more likely to engage in system-
atic but biased processing when heuristic cues were inconsistent with their vested 
interests (i.e., participants who performed better on multiple choice exams learned 
that most students favored a move to all-essay exams in upper-level classes). Un-
able to defend their vested interests based on cues alone, participants devoted 
more attention to a set of comments from other students that contained arguments 
for and against the proposal. 
In our studies, participants may have been somewhat threatened to learn that 
an expert opposed a policy that they thought would bring them benefits (e.g., 
relaxation, fun, or more time to work). In order to defend their existing attitudes 
and perceived material interests, they may have tried to counterargue the expert’s 
message only to fail somewhat in the strong causal argument condition. The rea-
son for not processing as much in the other conditions would be that participants 
were able to defend their attitudes and interests based on simple cues (e.g., people 
with low expertise are often wrong). 
We favor accuracy over defense motivation for three reasons. First, in Study 2, 
we doubt that the causal confidence prime would have had the observed effect if 
defense motivation were operating. Because causal confidence was primed in an 
ostensibly separate study, it seems unlikely that participants would have identi-
fied it as a legitimate discounting cue (e.g., “I have a feeling he does not under-
stand why events occur”). Additionally, argument type should not have mattered 
if participants were simply detecting negative cues. The logical prediction for de-
fense motivated perceivers would have been a Content Area Expertise X Argu-
ment Quality interaction such that argument quality mattered more in the high 
compared to low content-area expertise condition. However, this was not what we 
observed.
Second, we think that scrutinizing the causal arguments in the high causal confi-
dence prime/high content-area expertise condition would have been an unattract-
ive option for defense-motivated participants. Such a well qualified source could 
easily craft arguments that would be difficult to counterargue. Other strategies 
such as defensive inattention (Chaiken et al., 1996) may have been preferable. In 
contrast, participants in Giner-Sorolla and Chaiken’s (1997) study knew the mes-
sage would contain some support for their existing beliefs and that the arguments 
were generated by fellow students.
Third, additional analyses revealed that our predicted effects held even among 
those with the lowest levels of self-investment: seniors, who would be unlikely to 
benefit from any change. Participants had reported their academic classification in 
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Studies 1 (27% seniors) and 2 (66% seniors). Initial analyses revealed that academic 
status did not moderate our predicted effects. When we limited our samples to se-
niors and repeated our main analyses, the predicted interactions were significant 
in Studies 1, F(1, 22) = 6.20, p < .05, and 2, F(1, 100) = 3.85, p = .05. Furthermore, the 
critical comparisons between strong and weak causal arguments in the high causal 
expertise condition in Study 1, t(22) = 1.83, p < .05, and in the high causal confi-
dence prime/high content area expertise condition in Study 2, t(27) = 2.88, p < .01, 
also were significant. Given that even participants who would not be personally 
affected by the issue showed the predicted effect, it seems unlikely that defense of 
material interests played much of a role.
conclUSIonS
The current set of findings extend existing knowledge about the effectiveness of 
causal arguments in persuasive communication. Initial research on causal argu-
ments demonstrated a main effect: causal arguments can be more effective than 
non-causal arguments for changing beliefs (Slusher & Anderson, 1996). Together, 
recent research (Tobin & Weary, 2008) and the current findings demonstrate the 
existence of two sets of moderating variables: (1) personal levels of causal uncer-
tainty and causal importance, and (2) the source’s level of perceived causal and 
content-area expertise. In light of these findings, it seems possible that the success 
of causal over non-causal arguments in Slusher and Anderson’s studies may have 
been due in part to participants’ doubts about how viruses are transmitted or the 
expertise of their source (i.e., an epidemiologist with the Center for Disease Con-
trol). 
Causal arguments may be utilized by educators, social scientists, or advertisers, 
as long as they are able to explain the underlying causal mechanism behind some 
event. In order to increase an audience’s motivation to attend to their causal argu-
ments, they could try to instill doubts in the audience’s existing level of causal 
understanding and emphasize the importance of causal understanding (Tobin & 
Weary, 2008). Alternatively, they could highlight the source’s causal and content-
area expertise, as we demonstrated in the current set of studies. Future research 
will undoubtedly reveal other potential moderators, as well as factors that can lead 
to a cue-based acceptance of causal over non-causal arguments. For now, however, 
the available literature points to the potential value of causal arguments in produc-
ing a lasting change in attitudes and beliefs.
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Sentences used in the scrambled sentence task (unscrambled). 
high Causal Confidence
he understands their behavior. cause
She listened to them. confident
They found it clear. why 
he often feels knowledgeable. performance
They knew her motives. interact
her friends didn’t call. sure
her success impresses them. definite
he read her letter. comprehend
She expected her grade. jeans
he praised their work. certain
low Causal Confidence
Their behavior puzzles him. cause
She listened to them. confusing
They found it unclear. why
he often feels perplexed. performance
They doubt her motives. interact 
her friends didn’t call. unsure
her success impresses them. bewildering
he read her letter. misunderstand
her grade was unexpected. jeans
he praised their work. uncertain
filler
I ate my lunch. magazine
She looks very fit. sidewalk
he took the container. noise
My friend went home. example
I washed the car. transfer
The room is empty. baton
The pen is mine. rotate
She’s on a ledge. surf
The light came on. envelope
he folded the paper. runner
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